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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________________ 
NO. 09-2594 
______________________ 
BERNARDO CASTILLO 
Petitioner 
v. 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
________________________ 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
No. A090-260-288 
Immigration Judge:  Hon. Henry S. Dogin 
_________________________ 
Argued December 14, 2010 
 
BEFORE:  SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., and 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
__________________________ 
 
(Opinion Filed January 11, 2011) 
__________________________ 
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Micaela M. Alvarez, Esq. 
Francis X. Geier, Esq. (Argued) 
416 36th Street – Suite 1 
Union City, NJ  07087 
  Attorneys for Petitioner 
 
A. Marisa Chun, Esq. (Argued) 
U.S. Department of Justice 
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. – Room 5706 
Washington, DC  20530 
  and 
Cindy S. Ferrier, Esq. 
R. Alexander Goring, Esq. 
Eric H. Holder, Jr., Esq. 
Thomas W. Hussey, Esq. 
Justin R. Markel, Esq. 
Keith I. McManus, Esq. 
Phillip M. Truman, Esq. 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC  20044 
  Attorneys for Respondent 
 
_____________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________________ 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 Bernardo Castillo, a native and citizen of Peru, has filed a petition for review of a 
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (―BIA‖).  We will grant the petition. 
I. 
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 Castillo entered the United States in 1985 without inspection, became a temporary 
resident in 1988, and adjusted to lawful permanent resident status in December 1990.  
Prior to that adjustment, however, in 1989, he was convicted in state court in New Jersey 
of receiving stolen property.  In January, 1994, a New Jersey court convicted him of 
having committed a violation of New Jersey‘s shoplifting statute on July 30, 1993.  He 
was thereafter convicted of receiving stolen property three more times and of contempt 
on another occasion.  In light of these convictions, the Department of Homeland Security 
placed Castillo in removal proceedings. 
 Before the Immigration Judge (―IJ‖), Castillo admitted his criminal history and 
conceded removability, but argued eligibility for, inter alia, cancellation of removal 
pursuant to Section 240A(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (―INA‖), 8 U.S.C. § 
1229b(a).  The IJ denied relief and ordered Castillo removed from the United States.  
Castillo appealed, and the BIA dismissed his appeal. 
II. 
 
 We have jurisdiction over the petition for review pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  
―Because the BIA issued its own decision, we review that decision, and not that of the 
IJ.‖  Sheriff v. Attorney Gen., 587 F.3d 584, 588 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Ezeagwuna v. 
Ashcroft, 301 F.3d 116, 126 (3d Cir. 2002)).  ―The BIA‘s factual findings are reviewed 
for substantial evidence.‖  Briseno-Flores v. Attorney Gen., 492 F.3d 226, 228 (3d Cir. 
2007).   
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 ―This Court reviews the BIA‘s legal determinations de novo, subject to the 
principles of deference articulated in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844, 
104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984).‖  Id. (citing Wang v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 347, 
349 (3d Cir. 2004)).  ―Accordingly, ‗if the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of 
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.‘‖ Acosta v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43).  ―On the other hand, if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the 
agency‘s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.‖  Id. (internal 
quotation and citation omitted).  ―In its interpretation of the INA, the BIA should be 
afforded Chevron deference as it gives ambiguous statutory terms concrete meaning 
through a process of case-by-case adjudication.‖  Id. (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
III.
 
 Castillo challenges the BIA‘s ruling on his eligibility for cancellation of removal 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).  That section provides that the Attorney General may 
cancel the removal of an alien who (1) has been a lawful permanent resident for not less 
than five years, (2) ―has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having 
been admitted in any status,‖ and (3) has not been convicted of an aggravated felony.  8 
U.S.C. § 1229b(a).  Continuous residence, however, ends ―when the alien has committed 
an offense . . . that renders the alien . . . removable from the United States under section 
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237(a)(2)‖ of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2).  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(B).  Under 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), an alien is removable, inter alia, if he ―is convicted of two or 
more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal 
misconduct.‖  The BIA determined that the shoplifting offense committed by Castillo on 
July 30, 1993, was his second ―crime involving moral turpitude,‖ his first being his 
conviction for receipt of stolen property.  Thus, ruled the BIA, Castillo was rendered 
removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), and his period of continuous residence 
ended on July 30, 1993, short of the requisite seven years, given that he was admitted as a 
temporary resident in 1988. 
 Castillo does not maintain that the conduct proscribed by New Jersey‘s shoplifting 
statute fails to involve ―moral turpitude‖ within the meaning of § 1227(a)(2).  Rather, he 
contends that the BIA erred in ruling that his shoplifting conviction was for a ―crime‖ 
because under New Jersey law at the time, shoplifting was not a ―crime,‖ but rather a 
―disorderly persons offense.‖  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-11(c) (1994) (―Any person 
found guilty of [shoplifting] under subsection b. is a disorderly person . . . .‖).  In support 
of this contention, Castillo points out that under New Jersey law in 1994: 
(1) ―Disorderly persons offenses . . . are petty offenses and 
are not crimes within the meaning of the Constitution of this 
State.‖  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C1-4(b) (1994). 
 
(2) ―There shall be no right to indictment by a grand jury nor 
any right to trial by jury on‖ disorderly persons offenses.  Id. 
 
(3) ―Conviction of such offenses shall not give rise to any 
disability or legal disadvantage.‖  Id. 
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(4)  In carrying its burden of proving the element of the 
disorderly persons offense of shoplifting that the defendant 
intended to deprive the merchant of possession, the state is 
aided by a presumption arising from intentional concealed 
possession of merchandise while on the merchant‘s property.  
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:20-11(d) (1994). 
 
 In further support of his contention, Castillo relies upon the BIA‘s decision in In 
re Eslamizar, 23 I. & N. Dec. 684 (2004), in which the respondent had been found guilty 
of a ―violation‖ of an Oregon statute prohibiting shoplifting.  Oregon law defined 
―crimes‖ and ―violations‖ in mutually exclusive terms, and conviction of a ―violation‖ 
did ―not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a crime.‖  
Id. at 687.  Under its law, prosecutions of ―violations‖ involved proceedings which 
differed from those in criminal proceedings in that, among other things, the state needed 
only to prove guilt by a preponderance of the evidence.  Id.  The IJ concluded that the 
―Oregon judgment issued against the respondent did not qualify as a ‗conviction‘ for a 
‗crime‘ that could give rise to immigration consequences.‖  Id. at 685.  The BIA agreed 
with this conclusion.  Id. n.2.  Its analysis placed its primary emphasis on the INA 
definition of ―conviction‖ found in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). 1   While acknowledging 
                                              
1
 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) provides: 
 The term ―conviction‖ means, with respect to an alien, 
a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, 
if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where— 
  (i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty 
   or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo 
   contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to 
   warrant a finding of guilt, and 
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that the respondent had been ―convicted‖ under a literal reading of that statutory 
definition, the BIA ultimately concluded that ―by ‗judgment of guilt‘ Congress most 
likely intended to refer to a judgment in a criminal proceeding, that is, a trial or other 
proceeding whose purpose is to determine whether the accused committed a crime and 
which provides the constitutional safeguards normally attendant upon criminal 
adjudication.‖  Id. at 687 (italics in original).  The judgment against the respondent was 
found not to meet this understanding of the phrase ―judgment of guilt.‖  The BIA did not 
speak further on whether the respondent had committed a ―crime‖ that could give rise to 
immigration consequences. 
 While the BIA‘s opinion in Castillo‘s case makes clear that it regards the conduct 
prohibited by New Jersey‘s shoplifting statute as involving moral turpitude within the 
meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), it does not reach the issue of whether Castillo 
was ―convicted of [a] crime[]‖ within the meaning of that statute.  The BIA did not reach 
that issue because it applied the then current version of the New Jersey statute rather than 
the version in effect at the time of Castillo‘s offense.  As a result, its ruling on the issue 
tendered to us by Castillo was as follows: 
 The respondent argues that his shoplifting offense 
should be considered a disorderly persons offense, rather than 
a crime.  Under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-11(c), there are 4 
gradations of shoplifting offenses.  Three are crimes and one 
is a disorderly persons offense.  The respondent has the 
                                                                                                                                                  
    (ii) the judge has ordered some form of 
   punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien‘s 
   liberty to be imposed. 
 
 8 
burden of establishing his eligibility for any requested relief 
from removal.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d).  If the evidence 
indicates (as is the case here) that one or more grounds for 
mandatory denial of the application for relief may apply, the 
alien shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence that such grounds do not apply.  Id.  As there is 
no evidence in this case that the respondent‘s shoplifting 
offense was prosecuted as a disorderly persons offense rather 
than a crime, the respondent has not met his burden of 
establishing that he is eligible for cancellation of removal 
under section 240A(a) of the Act. 
 
App. at v-vi (footnote omitted). 
 
 Under § 2C:2-11(c) as it existed at the time of Castillo‘s shoplifting offense, all 
four gradations of the offense were disorderly persons offenses and, accordingly, we 
cannot sustain the BIA‘s ruling based on its supporting rationale.  There is no doubt that 
Castillo was found guilty of a disorderly persons offense and the issue of whether that 
constitutes being ―convicted of [a] crime[]‖ within the meaning of § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) 
cannot be avoided.  We decline to address it in the first instance because it is an issue of 
some substance and because we owe Chevron deference to the BIA‘s reading of the 
statutes whose execution it oversees.  We will remand to secure the benefit of the BIA‘s 
understanding of the phrase ―convicted of [a] crime[]‖ as used in § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
 The BIA‘s application of the 2006 version of the statute rather than the 1994 
version is not harmless error as the government suggests.  While it is true that 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(48)(A) defines the term ―conviction‖ for purposes of the INA and that that 
definition is ―not dependent on the vagaries of state law,‖ Appellee‘s Br. at 21 n.7, the 
issue posed by Castillo turns on whether he was ―convicted of [a] crime[]‖ within the 
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meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).  That is clearly a question of federal, not state, 
law, but it is not one directly answered in the INA or the BIA‘s opinion in Eslamizar.  
While the statutory definition of ―conviction‖ may be found to assist in the analysis, even 
given that definition, one must still ask ―conviction‖ of what. 
IV. 
 Castillo advances a ―due process‖ argument that closely tracks the foregoing 
argument regarding statutory construction.  Disposition of it should await the disposition 
of that statutory argument. 
 Castillo also argues that his lawful permanent resident status was erroneously 
rescinded in violation of the teachings of Bamidele v. INS, 99 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 1996), 
and Garcia v. Attorney Gen., 553 F.3d 724 (3d Cir. 2009).  We are unpersuaded.  In 
Bamidele and Garcia, the deportation orders of the INS rested solely on the ground that 
the respondents were found to have secured adjustment of status through fraud, and a 
five-year statute of limitations barred any attack on the alleged frauds.  Here, Castillo‘s 
removal order is based on his substantial criminal record, which he acknowledged from 
the outset, and he points to no applicable statute of limitations that has been violated. 
V. 
 The petition for review will be granted, and this matter will be remanded to the 
BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
